From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism
Dean Zimmerman
Rutgers University
April 22, 2010
[Forthcoming in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. LXXXIV
(2010)]
Abstract:
Property dualism is enjoying a slight resurgence in popularity, these days; substance dualism, not so much. But it is not as easy as one might think to be a property dualist and a substance materialist. The reasons for being a property dualist support the idea that some phenomenal properties (or qualia) are as fundamental as the most basic physical properties; but what material objects could be the bearers of the qualia? If even some qualia require an adverbial construal (if they are modifications of the thing that is conscious because of them, not properties of something else to which the subject of consciousness is related), then the property dualist can be driven to speculative forms of materialism — none of which, at this point, looks more likely to be true than the more modest versions of emergent dualism defended by contemporary substance dualists.
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