Philosophy of Science, 76 (December 2009) pp. 838–850Copyright 2009 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
0031-8248/2009/7605-0026 $10.00 What Does It Mean to Be 75% Pumpkin? The Units of Comparative Genomics
Monika Piotrowska†‡
Comparative genomicists seem to be convinced that the unit of measurement employed in their studies is a gene that drives the function of cells and ultimately organisms. As a result, they have come to some substantive conclusions about how similar humans are to other organisms based on the percentage of genetic makeup they share. I argue that the actual unit of measurement employed in the studies corresponds to a structural rather than a functional gene concept, thus rendering many of the implications drawn from comparative genomic studies largely unwarranted, if not completely mistaken.
†To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, 215 South Central Campus Drive, Carolyn Tanner Irish Humanities Building, 4th Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84112; e‐mail:monika.piotrowska@utah.edu.
‡Special thanks to Steve Downes for valuable comments, criticism, and encouragement. I am also grateful to Bryan Benham, Matt Haber, Anya Plutynski, and Jim Tabery for helpful feedback, and most of all to Matt Mosdell, whose healthy skepticism of statistics inspired me to write this article. Earlier versions of this work were presented at ISHPSSB 2007 in Exeter and PSA 2008 in Pittsburgh. Conversations with various audience members helped clarify my ideas on the topic.
Monika Piotrowska†‡
Comparative genomicists seem to be convinced that the unit of measurement employed in their studies is a gene that drives the function of cells and ultimately organisms. As a result, they have come to some substantive conclusions about how similar humans are to other organisms based on the percentage of genetic makeup they share. I argue that the actual unit of measurement employed in the studies corresponds to a structural rather than a functional gene concept, thus rendering many of the implications drawn from comparative genomic studies largely unwarranted, if not completely mistaken.
†To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, 215 South Central Campus Drive, Carolyn Tanner Irish Humanities Building, 4th Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84112; e‐mail:monika.piotrowska@utah.edu.
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‡Special thanks to Steve Downes for valuable comments, criticism, and encouragement. I am also grateful to Bryan Benham, Matt Haber, Anya Plutynski, and Jim Tabery for helpful feedback, and most of all to Matt Mosdell, whose healthy skepticism of statistics inspired me to write this article. Earlier versions of this work were presented at ISHPSSB 2007 in Exeter and PSA 2008 in Pittsburgh. Conversations with various audience members helped clarify my ideas on the topic.
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NOTA CAUSTICANTE DESTE BLOGGER:
A cada dia que passa vai ficando cada vez mais ridícula a comparação de 99% de semelhança entre chimpanzés e humanos [quando na verdade fica em torno de 70%], e cada vez menos improvável esta semelhança com pesquisas assim.
Fui, nem sei por que, pensando no gorila Idi Amim 'preso' no Zoológico de Belo Horizonte. Será que ele ainda está vivo?
Assista a um vídeo do Idi Amin no blog Biotransitando da Dani Benaion.
