Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A
Volume 42, Issue 1, March 2011, Pages 117-124
doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.11.031Kuhn vs. Popper on criticism and dogmatism in science: a resolution at the group level
Darrell P. Rowbottom a
a Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, United Kingdom
Available online 26 January 2011.
Abstract
Popper repeatedly emphasised the significance of a critical attitude, and a related critical method, for scientists. Kuhn, however, thought that unquestioning adherence to the theories of the day is proper; at least for ‘normal scientists’. In short, the former thought that dominant theories should be attacked, whereas the latter thought that they should be developed and defended (for the vast majority of the time).
Both seem to have missed a trick, however, due to their apparent insistence that each individual scientist should fulfil similar functions (at any given point in time). The trick is to consider science at the group level; and doing so shows how puzzle solving and ‘offensive’ critical activity can simultaneously have a legitimate place in science. This analysis shifts the focus of the debate. The crucial question becomes ‘How should the balance between functions be struck?’
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