Design Hypotheses Behave Like Skeptical Hypotheses (or: Why We Can’t Know the Falsity of Design Hypotheses)
Authors: René van Woudenberg1 and Jeroen de Ridder1
Source: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, Volume 7, Issue 2, pages 69 – 90 Publication Year : 2017
DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20171192
ISSN: 2210-5697 E-ISSN: 2210-5700
Document Type: Research Article
Subjects: Philosophy
Keywords: skeptical theism; radical skepticism; proper function; teleology; design
Source/Fonte: The Logical Place
Abstract
It is often claimed that, as a result of scientific progress, we now know that the natural world displays no design. Although we have no interest in defending design hypotheses, we will argue that establishing claims to the effect that we know the denials of design hypotheses is more difficult than it seems. We do so by issuing two skeptical challenges to design-deniers. The first challenge draws inspiration from radical skepticism and shows how design claims are at least as compelling as radical skeptical scenarios in undermining knowledge claims, and in fact probably more so. The second challenge takes its cue from skeptical theism and shows how we are typically not in an epistemic position to rule out design.
Affiliations: 1: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, r.van.woudenberg@vu.nl; g.j.de.ridder@vu.nl
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NOTA DESTE BLOGGER:
Em nossos debates com os negacionistas do design, especialmente os biólogos evolucionistas, de modo civil procuramos demonstrar o absurdo da negação do design encontrado na natureza, especialmente em sistemas biológicos de complexidade irredutível e da informação complexa especificada digitalizada do DNA. Aqui, dois autores não proponentes do design inteligente, fazem isso com maestria epistêmica.
