Prediction and Explanation in Historical Natural Science
Carol E. Cleland
- Author Affiliations
Philosophy Department Center for Astrobiology University of Colorado Boulder, CO 80309, USA carol.cleland@colorado.edu
Abstract
In earlier work (Cleland [2001], [2002]), I sketched an account of the structure and justification of ‘prototypical’ historical natural science that distinguishes it from ‘classical’ experimental science. This article expands upon this work, focusing upon the close connection between explanation and justification in the historical natural sciences. I argue that confirmation and disconfirmation in these fields depends primarily upon the explanatory (versus predictive or retrodictive) success or failure of hypotheses vis-à-vis empirical evidence. The account of historical explanation that I develop is a version of common cause explanation. Common cause explanation has long been vindicated by appealing to the principle of the common cause. Many philosophers of science (e.g., Sober and Tucker) find this principle problematic, however, because they believe that it is either purely methodological or strictly metaphysical. I defend a third possibility: the principle of the common cause derives its justification from a physically pervasive time asymmetry of causation (a.k.a. the asymmetry of overdetermination). I argue that explicating the principle of the common cause in terms of the asymmetry of overdetermination illuminates some otherwise puzzling features of the practices of historical natural scientists.
1 Introduction
2 The Methodology of Historical Natural Science
3 Justification in Historical Natural Science
3.1 Prediction
3.2 Adequate historical explanations are not potential predictions
3.3 The centrality of common cause explanation
4 Common Cause Explanation and the Asymmetry of Overdetermination
4.1 The priority of common cause over separate causes explanations
4.2 The threat of information degrading processes
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
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NOTA DESTE BLOGGER:
Mais uma vez este blogger destaca a pesquisa de Carol E. Cleland, do Departamento de Filosofia do Centro de Astrobiologia da Universidade do Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309, USA carol.cleland@colorado.edu, sobre a validade científica das teorias históricas naturais.
Mais uma vez este blogger destaca a pesquisa de Carol E. Cleland, do Departamento de Filosofia do Centro de Astrobiologia da Universidade do Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309, USA carol.cleland@colorado.edu, sobre a validade científica das teorias históricas naturais.
A maioria dos cientistas na Nomenklatura científica e a totalidade da Galera dos meninos e meninas de Darwin desconhecem que tanto a teoria da evolução de Darwin através da seleção natural e n mecanismos evolucionários (de A a Z, vai que um falhe...) e a teoria do Design Inteligente são teorias científicas históricas. Assim, quando, na ignorância deste aspecto metodológico das duas teorias científicas de longo alcance histórico, eles criticam a TDI, eles automaticamente estão tecendo críticas à teoria da evolução de Darwin. Saiba mais sobre a equivalência metodológica das duas teorias de longo alce histórico aqui.
