A Brief (Hi)Story of Just-So Stories in Evolutionary Science
Michal Hubálek
First Published August 6, 2020
https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393120944223
Volume: 51 issue: 5, page(s): 447-468
Article first published online: August 6, 2020; Issue published: September 1, 2021
Michal Hubálek 1
1 University of Hradec Králové, Hradec Králové, Czech Republic
Corresponding Author:
Michal Hubálek, Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences, University of Hradec Králové, Hradec Králové, EU 500 03, Czech Republic. Email: hubalek.michal.42@gmail.com
Abstract
In this essay, I examine the usage of the term “just-so story.” I attempt to show that just-so storytelling can be seen as an epistemic concept that, in various ways, tackles the epistemological and methodological problems relating to evolutionary explanations qua historical/narrative explanations. I identify two main, yet mutually exclusive, strategies of employing the concept of a just-so story: a negative strategy and a positive strategy. Subsequently, I argue that these strategies do not satisfactorily capture the core of the “original” meaning advanced by Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin at the end of the 1970s. I revisit the foundation(s) of their anti-adaptationist critique in order to reframe it as a critique of distinctive methodological manners and epistemic maxims related to historical inquiry. Last but not least, I suggest that contemporary evolutionary thinkers have two conceptually different options: they can either adhere to the “original” meaning of the term “just-so story” or accept that “just-so story” is a term equivalent to “implausible narrative explanation.”
Keywords just-so story, narrative explanation, adaptationism, Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Lewontin
Subscription or payment needed/Requer assinatura ou pagamento: Philosophy of the Social Sciences
